Germany -- Foreign relations -- Turkey; Turkey -- Foreign relations -- Germany; World War, 1914-1918 -- Turkey
Neither Wangenheim nor Pallavicini believed that the disastrous
experience of the 18th would end the naval attack, and for days they
anxiously waited for the fleet to return. This was the general
expectation, for no one believed that the Allies, after making this
great demonstration, would accept defeat after the loss of only three
ships. The high tension lasted for days and weeks after the repulse of
the 18th. We were still momentarily expecting the renewal of the attack.
But the great armada never returned.
Should it have come back? Could the Allied ships really have captured
Constantinople? I am constantly asked this question. As a layman my own
opinion can have little value, but I have quoted the opinions of the
German Generals and Admirals, and of the Turks--practically all of whom,
excepting Enver, believed that the enterprise would succeed, and I am
half inclined to believe that Enver’s attitude was merely a case of
graveyard whistling. In what I now have to say on this point, therefore,
I wish it understood that I am giving, not my own views, but merely
those of the officials then in Turkey who were best qualified to judge.
Enver had told me, in our talk on the deck of the Yuruk, that he had
“plenty of guns, plenty of ammunition.” But this statement was not true.
A glance at the map will show why Turkey was not receiving munitions
from Germany or Austria at that time. The fact was that Turkey was just
as completely isolated from her allies then as was Russia. There were
two railroad lines leading from Constantinople to Germany. One went by
way of Bulgaria and Serbia. Bulgaria was then not an ally. Even though
she had winked at the passage of guns and shells, this line could not
have been used, since Serbia, which controlled the vital link extending
from Nish to Belgrade, was still intact.
The other railroad line went through Rumania, by way of Bucharest. This
route was independent of Serbia, and, had the Rumanian Government
consented, it would have formed a clear route from the Krupps to the
Dardanelles. The fact that munitions could be sent off with the
connivance of the Rumanian Government perhaps accounts for the suspicion
that guns and shells were going by that route. Day after day the French
and British Ministers protested at Bucharest against this alleged
violation of neutrality, only to be met with angry denials that the
Germans were using this line. There is no doubt now that the Rumanian
Government was perfectly honourable in making these denials. It is not
unlikely that the Germans themselves started all these stories, merely
to fool the Allied fleet into the belief that their supplies were
inexhaustible.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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