revolution unless the war quickly came to an end. As I wrote the State Department about this time, “these men are willing to do almost anything to retain their power.” Still, I did not take Enver’s importunities for peace any too seriously. “Are you speaking for yourself and your party in this matter,” I asked him, “or do you really speak for Germany also? I cannot submit a proposition from you unless the Germans are back of you. Have you consulted them about this?” “No,” Enver replied, “but I know how they feel.” “That is not sufficient,” I answered; “you had better communicate with them directly through the German Embassy. I would not be willing to submit a proposition that was not endorsed by all the Teutonic Allies.” Enver replied that he did not think it worth while to discuss the matter with the German Ambassador. He said, however, that he was just leaving for Orsova, a town on the Bulgarian and Rumanian frontier, where he was to have a conference with Falkenhayn, at that time the German Chief-of-Staff. Falkenhayn, said Enver, was the important man; he would take up the question of peace with him. “Why do you think that it is a good time to discuss peace now?” I asked. “Because in two weeks we shall have completely annihilated Serbia. We think that will put the Allies in a frame of mind to discuss peace. My visit to Falkenhayn is to complete arrangements for the invasion of Egypt. In a very few days we expect Greece to join us. We are already preparing tons or provisions and fodder to send to Greece. And when we get Greece, of course, Rumania will come in. When the Greeks and Rumanians join us we shall have a million fresh troops. We shall get all the guns and ammunition we need from Germany as soon as the direct railroad is opened. All these things make it an excellent time for us to take up the matter of peace.” I asked the Minister of War to talk the matter over with Falkenhayn in his proposed interview, and report to me when he returned. In some way this conversation came to the ears of the new German Ambassador, Graf von Metternich, who immediately called to discuss the subject. He apparently wished to impress upon me two things: that Germany would never surrender Alsace-Lorraine and that she would insist on the return of all her colonies. I replied that it was apparently useless to discuss peace unless England first won some great military victory.