goes in, we shall fight to the end, and it will be a very long and a very determined struggle.” After three years I have no reason to be ashamed of either of these prophecies. I sometimes wonder what Zimmerman now thinks of my statements. After the explanation, Zimmerman began to talk about Turkey. He was very interested in finding out whether the Turks were likely to make a separate peace. I bluntly told him that the Turks felt themselves to be under no obligations to the Germans. This gave me another opportunity. “I have learned a good deal about German methods in Turkey,” I said. “I think it would be a great mistake to attempt similar tactics in the United States. I speak of this because there has been a good deal of sabotage there already. This in itself is solidifying the German-Americans against you, and is, more than anything else, driving the United States into the arms of England.” “But the German Government is not responsible,” said Zimmerman. “We know nothing about it.” Naturally I could not accept that statement on its face value--recent developments have shown how mendacious it was--but we passed to other topics. The matter of the submarine came up again. “We have voluntarily interned our Navy,” said Zimmerman. “We can do nothing at sea except with our submarines. It seems to me that the United States is making a serious mistake in so strongly opposing the submarine. You have a long coastline and you may need the U-boat yourself some day. Suppose one of the European Powers, and particularly Japan, should attack you. You could use the submarine to good purpose then. Besides, if you insist on this proposed declaration in the _Lusitania_ matter, you will simply force our Government into the hands of the Tirpitz party.” Zimmerman now returned again to the situation in Turkey. His questions showed that he was much displeased with the new German Ambassador, Graf von Metternich. Metternich, it seemed, had not made a success of winning the goodwill of the reigning powers in Turkey and had been a trial to the German Foreign Office. Metternich had shown a different attitude toward the Armenians from Wangenheim, and he had made sincere attempts with Talaat and Enver to stop them. Zimmerman now told me that Metternich had made a great mistake in doing this and had destroyed his influence at Constantinople. Zimmerman made no effort to conceal his displeasure over Metternich’s manifestation of a humanitarian spirit. I now saw that Wangenheim had really represented the attitude of official Berlin, and I thus had confirmation, from the highest German authority, of my conviction that Germany had silently acquiesced in those deportations. * * * * * In a few days we had taken the steamer at Copenhagen, and on February 22nd I found myself once more sailing into New York Harbour. INDEX Abdul-Hamid, 6, 9, 186, 188 Adrianople, 9, 19, 173, 178 Ægean Coast, Greek population of, 30