Such was the conclusion finally agreed upon. General Montgomery wrote out the necessary order and handed it to the Judge. Next day, after all the business before the court had been disposed of as usual, the Judge read General Montgomery's order from the bench, and explained to those present why it had been issued. Had a cannon burst then and there and killed a hundred men, the surprise could not have been greater. Some raved at Attorney-General Bates, and pro-slavery men generally; others cursed General McClellan and Northern sympathizers with rebellion, generally; deep and somewhat loud were the mutterings among all present; but the order was irrevocable, and thus closed at once and forever the provost-court of Alexandria. Had that court been continued, and others like it established in every city of the South, so soon as they came into the possession of Union troops, at least one hundred millions of dollars would have been collected from the property of Southern debtors and gone into the pockets of Northern creditors; the war would have ended two years sooner; over five hundred millions of dollars would have been saved to the United States treasury; and over one hundred thousand lives been saved to the homes and families of both the North and the South. Only at the last judgment-day will it be known how great was the mistake--a mistake which, in its ultimate consequences, was not less ruinous to the South than to the North--of those who insisted upon, and who finally compelled, the closing of the provost-court at Alexandria. We say this after a full consideration of the whole subject as drawn from the facts heretofore detailed in this volume, and do not think we shall have to take a single word of it back. True, very true, as eloquently stated in a letter from our old friend, J. E. Brush, Esq., of New York--"Floyd, Thompson, and Cobb, of Buchanan's Cabinet, had so disarmed and depleted the government of means, that Lincoln had very slender resources; and the gullibility of Northern business men in filling the orders of Southern men for war material, for months previous to the opening of the war, proves that they meant business, while the North did not take in the situation at all;" still we think, but for the secret machinations of Northern sympathizers--of men on whom, for a time, the government relied and entirely trusted, including generals in the field, officers in the navy, and even officers in the Cabinet--the war would have been ended at least two years sooner, and hundreds of millions saved to the taxpayers of the country.