In 1828 the Turkish population was full of hatred on account of the extermination of the Janissaries. The Christian population were ready to rise against the government, on account of the events of the Greek war. Albania was in revolt, because it was opposed to the system of conscriptions for regular military service. Anatolia was discontented on the same ground. Mehemet Ali possessed Egypt, and paralyzed the action of the government in Arabia and Syria. Servia had just laid down arms, but had not yet concluded peace. The Danubian principalities, though unfavourable to Russia, were not hearty in support of the Porte, and remained apathetic under the occupation of Russia. The revenue did not exceed 400,000,000 piastres (20,000,000 dollars), and was insufficient for a second campaign. The new army was not yet organized, and amounted only to 32,000 men, without tried generals. The fleet had been destroyed at Navarino. The foreign diplomatists had left the empire, and the capital was exposed to an attack of the enemy. In such a position no European government could have risked a war. Russia had just defeated Persia, and by this victory got access to the Asiatic provinces of the Turkish empire; it had therefore to defend the frontiers on both sides. Russia had not yet entered into Circassia, and could therefore rally all her forces; she had not yet abolished the Poland of 1815, and could leave it without garrisons; she had not yet roused the hatred or the jealousies of Europe. She had engaged all the natural allies of the Porte into a combination for rousing the populations of her enemy, and by her diplomacy she gained the power of bringing her fleet into the Mediterranean, for blockading the ports of Turkey; and Navarino opened for her the Black Sea, where she had thirteen men-of-war. Not disturbed by the Porte, by Circassia, by Poland, by France, or by England, she had prepared two years for this war, whilst her enemy, passing through a terrible crisis, was without money, without an organized army, without a fleet, without other resources than the feeble Mussulman population on the seat of war.