Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914
History
Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy 1738-1914
Great Britain -- Foreign relations; Speeches, addresses, etc., English
time, that it was necessary great forbearance should be shown towards
Denmark as the weaker Power; that the part evidently and confessedly
German should be given to the Duchy of Holstein; and with regard to
the mixed districts, as well as the Danish part, they should be left
to Denmark as a means of preserving her independence, and giving her a
mercantile and military line. Unhappily, my Lords, upon this occasion,
as throughout those questions, the German Powers, instead of taking
those views of generosity and forbearance which were urged so well by
the Emperor of the French, determined to insist on what, undoubtedly,
was their right if the right of conquest was the only one to be
considered. They stood on the right of conquest: they stood on the
victory they had gained on the disputed territory; but with respect
to generosity and forbearance towards a Power so disproportionate to
themselves--with respect to a due consideration for the peace of
Europe--with respect to the absence of a desire to rush again into
war in order to retain that which by right of conquest they might
say they had acquired--I should not be treating your Lordships
with sincerity if I said there was any such forbearance, any such
generosity, any such regard for the peace of Europe, manifested on the
part of Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation. I must say
likewise, my Lords, that there was an assumption which was not
justifiable on the part of Denmark, and in reference to which my
noble friend Lord Clarendon made a clear and pointed statement at a
subsequent meeting of the Conference. The Danish Government considered
that the line which we had proposed in the name of the neutral Powers,
and after consulting the neutral Powers, as a basis of pacification,
was an English proposal--an English proposal by which England was
bound to abide, and which she was bound to maintain at all hazards.
Nothing of the kind, however, was ever stated by the British
Plenipotentiaries; nothing of the kind had Denmark a right to expect.
I did inform the Danish Plenipotentiary, when there was a question of
continuing the Armistice, that I should not propose nor support any
division but the line of the Schlei without the consent of Denmark;
but I never gave him to understand that England would support that
line otherwise than by urging its adoption in conjunction with the
other neutral Powers at the meetings of the Conference. The last
suspension of arms was only for a fortnight, and it remained for us to
consider what should be done--the two parties being obstinately bent
on the maintenance of their different rights--the Germans insisting on
the line from Apenrade to Tondern, and the Danes insisting first
upon a line extending more to the south than that which the British
Plenipotentiary had proposed in the Conference, and afterwards
agreeing to that line, but declaring that they would make no
further concessions. What could be done to bring about an amicable
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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