Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and ClemencySeneca, Lucius Annaeus
Philosophy
Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus
Conduct of life; Ethics
There seems to be so near an affinity betwixt _wisdom_, _philosophy_,
and _good counsels_, that it is rather matter of curiosity than of
profit to divide them; _philosophy_, being only a _limited wisdom_;
and _good counsels a communication of that wisdom_, for the good of
_others_, as well as of _ourselves_; and to _posterity_, as well as to
the _present_. The _wisdom_ of the _ancients_, as to the government of
life, was no more than certain precepts, what to do and what not: and
men were much better in that simplicity; for as they came to be more
_learned_, they grew less careful of being _good_. That _plain_ and
_open virtue_ is now turned into a _dark_ and _intricate science_; and
we are taught to _dispute_ rather than to _live_. So long as wickedness
was simple, simple remedies also were sufficient against it; but now it
has taken root, and spread, we must make use of stronger.
There are some dispositions that embrace good things as soon as they
hear them; but they will still need quickening by admonition and
precept. We are rash and forward in some cases, and dull in others;
and there is no repressing of the one humor, or raising of the other,
but by removing the causes of them; which are (in one word) _false
admiration_ and _false fear_.
Every man knows his duty to his country, to his friends, to his
guests; and yet when he is called upon to draw his sword for the one,
or to labor for the other, he finds himself distracted betwixt his
apprehensions and his delights: he knows well enough the injury he
does his wife in the keeping of a wench, and yet his lust overrules
him: so that it is not enough to give good advice, unless we can take
away that which hinders the benefit of it. If a man does what he ought
to do, he will never do it constantly or equally, without knowing why
he does it: and if it be only chance or custom, he that does well by
chance, may do ill so too. And farther, a precept may direct us what
we _ought_ to do, and yet fall short in the manner of doing it: an
expensive entertainment may, in one case be extravagance or gluttony,
and yet a point of honor and discretion in another. Tiberius Cæsar had
a huge _mullet_ presented him, which he sent to the market to be sold:
“and now,” says he, “my masters,” to some company with him, “you shall
see that either Apicius or Octavius will be the chapman for this fish.”
Octavius beat the price, and gave about thirty pounds sterling for it.
Now, there was a great difference between Octavius, that bought it for
his luxury, and the _other_ that purchased it for a _compliment_ to
Tiberius. Precepts are idle, if we be not first taught what opinion
we are to have of the matter in question; whether it be _poverty_,
_riches_, _disgrace_, _sickness_, _banishment_, etc. Let us therefore
examine them one by one; not what they are _called_, but what in truth
they _are_. And so for the _virtues_; it is to no purpose to set a high
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