You will remember that Secretary Chase, desiring to sell Government bonds for the purpose of carrying on the war, secured legislation which put a tax of 10 per cent upon all bank note issues and compelled banks desiring to issue currency to buy Government bonds as a basis of their circulation. As a result, he produced a currency of uniform appearance that was of equal value everywhere and a great blessing to the country. This condition was a very great and most agreeable change in the currency experience of the country, because there had been practically no legislation except in a few states that in any way controlled banking practices, or currency issues. The result was that we had "Blue Pup Money," "Red Dog Money," "Wild Cat Money," "Yellow Dog Money" and every other kind of "Dog Gone Money," that could be gotten up with paint and paper to fool and defraud the people. On top of this situation there arose a terrific political prejudice engendered through political controversy toward a Central Bank. The conditions brought about by the legislation, secured by Chase, have kept up the present régime until it has become so utterly intolerable, because utterly unsound economically, and so disturbing to the general welfare as to compel immediate consideration and reconstruction. It is really the first time since the Civil War that the finances and banking of the country have become a serious question outside of the acute phases presented in the Government issues, or the Greenback craze of 1875 and the silver hallucination of 1896. Today, the question is not a specific one, or a mere detail, but one of fundamental principles and of a most comprehensive character. It involves the whole subject of governmental finance and banking and it is well that it should; for our business is so vast now, almost 50 per cent of the banking power of the world being within our borders. Our annual productions are approximately thirty-five billions. Our annual clearings will pass the fabulous mark of $170,000,000,000 (one hundred and seventy billions). So that every recurring financial disaster will be worse, if possible, than the one going before it. MR. BANKER: Right you are, Mr. Manufacturer, and this is true because the principles involved are as fundamental and immutable as the law of gravitation; and if we persist in our folly, when dealing with these enormous volumes of credit, the destruction that is sure to follow will be on a scale with that of worlds in collision.