We explain Aphasia as follows: The word [Greek: phasis] is used 192 in two ways, having a general and a special signification. According to the general signification, it expresses affirmation or negation, as "It is day" or "It is not day"; according to the special signification, it expresses an affirmation only, and negations are not called [Greek: phaseis]. Now Aphasia is the opposite of [Greek: phasis] in its general signification, which, as we said, comprises both affirmation and negation. It follows that Aphasia is a condition of mind, according to which we say that we neither affirm nor deny anything. It is evident from this that we do not understand by Aphasia something that 193 inevitably results from the nature of things, but we mean that we now find ourselves in the condition of mind expressed by it in regard to the things that are under investigation. It is necessary to remember that we do not say that we affirm or deny any of those things that are dogmatically stated in regard to the unknown, for we yield assent only to those things which affect our feelings and oblige us to assent to them. CHAPTER XXI. _"Perhaps," and "It is possible," and "It may be."_ The formulae "Perhaps," and "Perhaps not," and "It is 194 possible," and "It is not possible," and "It may be," and "It may not be," we use instead of "Perhaps it is," and "Perhaps it is not," and "It is possible that it is," and "It is possible that it is not," and "It may be that it is," and "It may be that it is not." That is, we use the formula "It is not possible" for the sake of brevity, instead of saying "It is not possible to be," and "It may not be" instead of "It may not be that it is," and "Perhaps not" instead of "Perhaps it is not." Again, we do not here dispute about words, neither do we question if the 195 formulae mean these things absolutely, but we use them loosely, as I said before. Yet I think it is evident that these formulae express Aphasia. For certainly the formula "Perhaps it is" really includes that which seems to contradict it, _i.e._ the formula "Perhaps it is not," because it does not affirm in in regard to anything that it is really so. It is the same also in regard to the others. CHAPTER XXII. [Greek: epoche] _or the Suspension of Judgment._ When I say that I suspend my judgment, I mean that I cannot 196 say which of those things presented should be believed, and which should not be believed, showing that things appear equal to me in respect to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. Now we do not affirm that they are equal, but we state what appears to us in regard to them at the time when they present themselves to us. [Greek: epoche] means the holding back of the opinion, so as neither to affirm nor deny anything because of the equality of the things in question. CHAPTER XXIII. _The Formula "I determine Nothing."_