Sextus Empiricus and Greek ScepticismPatrick, Mary Mills
Philosophy
Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism
Patrick, Mary Mills
Sextus Empiricus; Skepticism
Many also that love ugly women consider them very beautiful
Furthermore, there are differences which depend on hunger or 109
satiety, as the same food seems agreeable to those who are
hungry, and disagreeable to those who are satisfied. There are
also differences depending on drunkenness and sobriety, as that
which we consider ugly when we are sober does not appear ugly to
us when we are drunk. Again, there are differences depending 110
on predispositions, as the same wine appears sourish to those
who have previously eaten dates or dried figs, but agreeable to
those who have taken nuts or chickpeas; the vestibule of the
bath warms those who enter from without, but cools those who go
out, if they rest in it. Furthermore, there are differences 111
depending on being afraid or courageous, as the same thing
seems fearful and terrible to the coward, but in no wise so to
him who is brave. There are differences, also, depending on
being sad or joyful, as the same things are unpleasant to the
sad, but pleasant to the joyful. Since therefore the 112
anomalies depending on conditions are so great, and since men
are in different conditions at different times, it is perhaps
easy to say how each object appears to each man, but not so of
what kind it is, because the anomaly is not of a kind to be
judged. For he who would pass judgment upon this is either in
some one of the conditions mentioned above, or is in absolutely
no condition whatever; but to say that he is in no condition at
all, as, for example, that he is neither in health nor in
illness, that he is neither moving nor quiet, that he is not of
any age, and also that he is free from the other conditions, is
wholly absurd. But if he judges the ideas while he is in any 113
condition whatever, he is a part of the contradiction, and,
besides, he is no genuine critic of external objects, because he
is confused by the condition in which he finds himself.
Therefore neither can the one who is awake compare the ideas of
those who are asleep with those who are awake, nor can he who is
in health compare the ideas of the sick with those of the well;
for we believe more in the things that are present, and
affecting us at present, than in the things not present. In 114
another way, the anomaly in such ideas is impossible to be
judged, for whoever prefers one idea to another, and one
condition to another, does this either without a criterion and a
proof, or with a criterion and a proof; but he can do this
neither without them, for he would then be untrustworthy, nor
with them; for if he judges ideas, he judges them wholly by a
criterion, and he will say that this criterion is either true or
false. But if it is false, he will be untrustworthy; if, on 115
the contrary, he says that it is true, he will say that the
criterion is true either without proof or with proof. If without
proof, he will be untrustworthy; if he says that it is true with
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