“I too am a citizen of this country,” he declared, “and the father of children for whose happiness and welfare I feel a solicitude as lively and affectionate as any parent can feel. To the true happiness of my country I hope I know that I am sincerely and ardently attached. But I see no danger. I apprehend none for myself or my posterity. I am perfectly willing to risk my own life, liberty and happiness, and those of my posterity on the propriety of the principles which we recommend. Let them avoid traitorous conspiracies and designs fatal to the liberty and happiness of their fellow citizens; let them avoid traitorous assemblies, overt acts of war, and they will be safe.” Thus concluded Mr. Hay. Next on the list of pleaders was Luther Martin, but he sent word to the Court that he was not ready. So Mr. Charles Lee, of the defense, arose to fill the breech. It was one of the rare occasions when he was recorded as having spoken. Counsel for the defense had been waiting impatiently for a chance to pounce on the District Attorney from the moment he brought up Justice Chase and the Fries case. Now Mr. Lee had that agreeable opportunity. “The gentleman said in substance there was no difference between the opinion which we desire you to give and that for which Judge Chase was impeached,” charged Mr. Lee, addressing the Chief Justice. “It was very kind of the gentleman to remind the Court of the danger of a decision of the motion in favor of the prisoner, a decision like that which has already produced the impeachment of another judge.” Mr. Lee knew full well he was touching a tender spot. By thus accusing the District Attorney he was acting on the popular belief among Judge Marshall’s friends that the Chief Justice was himself as much on trial as was the prisoner at the bar. Mr. Hay was prompt to do what he could to counteract that impression. “The cases are different,” he replied. “What I said was only said to put Mr. Botts right in his misrepresentation. It was innocently said and compatible with the highest respect for the Court, not with the design which the gentleman (I will not say candidly) insinuates.” Here the Chief Justice intervened. “I did not consider you as making any personal allusion, but as merely referring to the law,” he assured Mr. Hay. Thus, with an exhibition of his customary common sense, Judge Marshall graciously accepted Mr. Hay’s explanation, whatever his innermost thoughts might have been. Mr. Lee, however, persisted. “The gentleman plainly insinuated the possibility of danger to the Court from a favorable opinion to the prisoner,” he protested, “because he said that the opinion which we claimed for him was the same in substance as had occasioned the impeachment of one judge already. It certainly would not be unfair to infer that it was intended to show that the same cause might again produce the same effect.”