Shout treason : $b the trial of Aaron BurrBeirne, Francis F.
History
Shout treason : $b the trial of Aaron Burr
Beirne, Francis F.
Burr Conspiracy, 1805-1807; Burr, Aaron, 1756-1836 -- Trials, litigation, etc.; Trials (Treason) -- United States
If the phrase meant what it seemed to mean then, surely, the absence
of Colonel Burr from Blennerhassett Island at the time of the alleged
overt act in no way relieved him of his guilt. Was the phrase a mere
_obiter dictum_ or chance remark as the defense maintained, or was it
a formal declaration of the court changing the previous conception of
treason as laid down in the Constitution as the prosecution assumed
it to be? The time had come for the Chief Justice to make known which
interpretation was correct.
He had heard, said Judge Marshall, that his opinion had been construed
to mean that any assemblage whatever for a treasonable purpose, whether
in force or not in force, whether in condition to use violence or not
in that condition, was levying war. It had not been expressly advanced
by the bar, but he understood it had been adopted elsewhere. (Anyone
who was at all conversant with the existing political situation knew
that the interpretation referred to was that of President Jefferson.
It had been adopted by his partisans, and it was because it had gained
such a firm hold that the incidents of Blennerhassett Island, mild
as they were, were assumed by the prosecution to fulfill the Chief
Justice’s definition of an overt act of levying war.)
Judge Marshall pointed out that the court which gave the opinion was
composed of four judges. Of these he said one was sick. He seemed
uncertain as to this judge’s opinion. Three judges were absent.
Therefore, said the Chief Justice, if the three judges who were absent
concurred with the sick judge who was present “and perhaps dissents,”
a majority of the judges might overrule the decision. A critical
observer might have charged that the Chief Justice was falling back
upon a good many suppositions.
What, he asked, was levying war? He had, he said, looked at all the
English authorities and, so far as he could see, levying war meant just
that. The words had received no technical meaning different from their
natural meaning. The assemblage must be a warlike assemblage, carrying
the appearance of force, and in a situation to practice hostility. The
Chief Justice added for good measure that the American judges, so far
as their opinions had been quoted, seemed to go even farther than the
English authorities and require the actual exercise of force.
But, he reminded, it had been said that all these authorities had been
overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the
United States versus Bollman and Swartwout. Now it would be expected
that an opinion which was to overrule all former precedents and to
establish a principle never before recognized would be expressed in
plain and explicit terms. Had the intention been to make so material
a change, then the Court ought to have expressly declared that any
assemblage of men whatever who had formed a treasonable design
constituted the fact of levying war. Yet no such declaration was made.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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