6. I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly in hand, entrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole place brought under regular military command, and careful arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the scattered fighting line, the hills would have been held, I am sure. 7. But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have been ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one succeeded him; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that guns were coming up, and generally there was a want of organisation and system that acted most unfavourably on the defence. It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the greatest gallantry throughout the day, and really saved the situation. Preparations for the second day’s defence should have been organised during the day, and have been commenced at nightfall. As this was not done, I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a wise discretion. Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, but the enemy admitted to our doctors that theirs were equally severe, and though we were not successful in retaining the position, the losses inflicted on the enemy and the attack generally have had a marked effect upon them. I cannot close these remarks without bearing testimony to the gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops: the endurance shown by the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex Regiment, and Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry was admirable, while the efforts of the 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles and 3rd Battalion King’s Royal Rifles were equally good, and the Royal Lancasters fought gallantly. I am writing to catch the mail, and have not any particulars yet to enable me to report more fully on details. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant, REDVERS BULLER. F REPORT BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR CHARLES WARREN, K.C.B., UPON THE CAPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT EVACUATION OF SPION KOP _Capture and Evacuation of Spion Kop_ Chief of the Staff,--I make the operations against Spion Kop in a separate report, because they did not enter into my original plans. Under the original instructions of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, of 15th January, 1900, I was to act as circumstances required, but, according to instructions, was generally to continue throughout refusing my right, and throwing my left forward until I gained the open plain north of Spion Kop. [Sidenote: 1]