About 11.10 A.M., in consequence of the regrettable news about General Woodgate, at your order I proceeded to the kop myself. On arrival there, I found the track leading up very much congested, and, from information received, I formed the opinion that too many men were getting into the trenches and stone cover above, and becoming exposed to the artillery fire; I accordingly checked reinforcements. Soon after this, on my way up, an urgent message was received from Colonel Hill, who commanded at this time on the right, calling for reinforcements, as his line had actually fallen back before, and lost some prisoners to the Boers, who were pressing on in front. I accordingly sent up the rest of the Imperial Light Infantry available. I now met Major Bayly, a Staff Officer, from the 4th Brigade, who informed me that an urgent message for help had been received from Colonel Crofton, who commanded on Spion Kop after General Woodgate was wounded. General Lyttelton had accordingly despatched the Scottish Rifles as an actual reinforcement, and a battalion of the King’s Royal Rifles against the hill to the north-west of Spion Kop. It was on the further slope of this hill that one of the Vickers-Maxim guns was placed. (This battalion worked its way some distance up the hill, but its action did not materially affect the situation.) I now again received an urgent appeal for support, this time for the centre and left. I sent the Scottish Rifles. I now had only as a reserve Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and the Dorsetshire Regiment. These I retained and they were not engaged at the actual front. The shell fire was most galling, and was aimed not only at the summit, but at the crest of the spur leading up, along which reinforcements and parties bringing back wounded had to pass. The fire came-- 1. From field guns firing shrapnel and common shell, situated, as I endeavoured to point out in a signal message to you, north-west of our position. 2. From a Vickers-Maxim, in about the same direction. 3. From a similar gun to the north-east. All these were beyond the effective rifle fire, and our supporting artillery on and about Three Tree Hill and on the Dragoon’s Maxim position apparently could not see them; consequently they poured, unchecked, an uninterrupted cross fire on to our position from about 8 A.M. till dark--ten hours.