About 2.20 A.M. a naval officer reported that he
had one 12-pr. gun below Spion Kop, near the donga on
the west. He said he had orders to take this up to
the summit. When asked whether he could do so before
daylight, he said he could not. As it would be impossible
to move the gun in any line after daybreak, on account
of hostile fire, he was told to stand by in a place of
safety. Signalling communication was now opened, and the
attached message[20] sent.
As Captain Phillips got no instructions, about 2.30
A.M. he ordered vehicles back to a place of safety.
All regimental wagons had been sent across by the
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General (B), 5th Division.
Shortly after 4 A.M., there still being no orders, and
a mass of transport, small-arm ammunition carts, &c.,
at the donga, steps were taken to cover this passage,
and, with the concurrence of the Officer Commanding
Dorsetshire Regiment, and Officer Commanding Scottish
Rifles, certain dispositions were made with the latter
battalion and about half the former. The other half of
the Dorsetshire Regiment were employed in carrying away a
large number of boxes (about 80) of small-arm ammunition,
brought back from the front and elsewhere.
The Imperial Light Infantry, Middlesex, and
Thorneycroft’s had apparently gone home. Bethune’s were
dismissed.
It was now light, and Boer ‘sniping’ commenced. Captain
Phillips reported to me at the donga, about 4.45 A.M.,
when I was in possession of your order as to the pontoon
crossing.
TALBOT COKE, _Major-General,
Commanding Right Attack_.}}
K
{{CASUALTIES
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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