‘The holding of such a position is not alluded to in our drill-book or in tactical works, nor is it likely to be in favour with book tacticians for a long time to come; it is of too practical a character--the natural outcome of our troops returning to primitive ways and instinctively securing a position they could hold under stress of severe fire. The tactics of the future must eventually recognise the importance of the method of holding a hill, for it was by clinging to the reverse slope of hills that we were enabled to relieve Ladysmith with so comparatively small a loss when advancing against a superior force. ‘It was in this manner that we held our ground against superior numbers on the hills above Venter’s Spruit from 17th to 25th January 1900. Sir R. Buller describes our troops on this occasion as perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, admitting of no second line, and in his telegram of 27th January he says, “The actual position held was perfectly tenable.” Mr. Winston Churchill describes the position as follows: “The infantry had made themselves masters of all the edge of the plateau, and the regiments clustered in the steep re-entrants like flies on the side of a wall.” All through our advance on Ladysmith the reverse slopes of hills we captured sheltered our forces. * * * * * ‘Let us consider Spion Kop as a hill on the line of our advance--was its capture likely to be advantageous or not? ‘The summit at its southern extremity (the highest point of all the range) outflanked and could see down into our position at Three Tree Hill, and though just out of rifle range this was an undoubted advantage to the enemy. Moreover, it was higher by about 150 feet than any portion of the enemy’s lines, and could enfilade their trenches at long rifle range, and could see into their works, and also dominate their camps to the north. ‘Evidently it was a desirable position for either side to hold; but while the enemy could not (according to their mode of fighting) put guns upon it, it could, if in our possession, be so utilised. Our guns, placed on the lower slopes, could search out some of the enemy’s guns behind the Rangeworthy hills, and guns placed on the summit (as they might have been ultimately) would have forced the enemy to retire from the Rangeworthy position, not necessarily altogether, but to take up a new position they had prepared further to the east. It was thus desirable as a possession if it were not an absolutely necessary objective in our advance.’