Captain Holmes Wilson in his ‘Relief of Ladysmith’ states that only the passive occupation of Spion Kop was contemplated, that ‘the passive occupation of Spion Kop could never have led to anything,’ that Spion Kop should not have been occupied unless it was intended to make at the same time a general advance along the whole line, and that ‘the mere fact of going to the top of a high hill cannot constitute a tactical success as long as the enemy’s moral courage lasts; when, however, the movement draws the fire of the whole of the opposing army it is more likely to end in a disaster than in defeat.’ These statements of Captain Wilson bristle with misapprehensions and misconceptions, and may be resolved into seven points on which explanations are necessary. (1) As to the advantages or disadvantages of holding a hill in the line of advance of an attacking force, the advantages are: (_a_) that the hill may give command of fire and a view of part of the enemy’s line; (_b_) that it cannot so readily be seen into or commanded by fire; and (_c_) that it gives protection from the enemy’s fire to troops properly placed behind it. The disadvantages arise when the hill projects so far into the enemy’s line that it can be taken in flank or in reverse by the enemy’s fire. (2) The advantages of the occupation of hills during the war are exemplified in the following: Rangeworthy, Mount Alice, Zwart Kop, Hussar Hill, The Gomba, Monte Christo, Llangwani, Colenso Hills, Hart’s Hill, and Pieters, with many others. In all these cases the hill was more or less exposed, but there were not such strenuous endeavours on the part of the Boers, and the British troops had learnt their lesson and knew how to dispose of themselves.