The selection of Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to take command over his seniors in the heat of action was a signal example of the danger of a serious departure from precedent at such a time. The difficulty of making a selection known and understood by all concerned was enormous, and the risks of mistakes most serious. Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Thorneycroft was only a major of six months’ standing in the Royal Scots Fusiliers, who held the local rank of Lieut.-Colonel while in command of a special corps. Brave and active to a degree, he was selected by Sir Redvers Buller because he was known as ‘a good hard-fighting man,’ and right well had he maintained his reputation during that morning; but, just because he was such a man, he was at the front in the thick of the fight. ‘The fight was too hot, too close, too interlaced for him to attend to anything but to support this company, clear those rocks, or line that trench.’[7] But the commander on the top should have been out of the thick of it, able to direct the general conduct of matters and to keep in touch with his General below, leaving the actual fighting to his many able subordinates; this meant a man of some experience in command, and this Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft, whatever else he was, certainly was not. Thus, although both the Officers Commanding Artillery and Engineers at the top of Spion Kop knew about the arrangements for bringing up guns and intrenching at night, he seems to have heard nothing about it, and so also about water, food, ammunition, &c. After General Coke’s arrival on the summit many of the troops who had formed the storming party were allowed to go down the hill to get water and food. About half-past four o’clock in the afternoon Sir Charles Warren received Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft’s message, sent from the top two hours before, in which the situation was described as follows: ‘Hung on till last extremity with the old force. Some of the Middlesex here now, and I hear Dorsets are coming up, but force really unable quite to hold so large a perimeter. Enemy’s guns on north-west sweep the whole of the top of the hill. They also have guns to east. Cannot you bring artillery fire to bear on north-west guns? What reinforcements can you send to hold the hill to-night? We are badly in want of water. There are many killed and wounded. If you wish to really make a certainty of the hill for the night, you must send more infantry and attack the enemy’s guns.’ Major-General Coke saw this message at his position at the signal station about three o’clock, just before leaving for the summit, and added the following observation: ‘I have seen the above and have ordered the Scottish Rifles and the King’s Royal Rifles to reinforce the Middlesex Regiment. The Dorset Regiment and the Imperial Light Infantry have also gone up. We appear to be holding our own at present.’