Slavery and four years of war : $b a political history of slavery in the United States, together with a narrative of the campaigns and battles of the Civil War in which the author took part, 1861-1865. Vols. 1-2Keifer, Joseph Warren
History
Slavery and four years of war : $b a political history of slavery in the United States, together with a narrative of the campaigns and battles of the Civil War in which the author took part, 1861-1865. Vols. 1-2
Keifer, Joseph Warren
Slavery -- United States; United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Campaigns
But political party ties North were the hardest to break. Those
who had been led to political success generally by the pro-slavery
politicians of the South could not easily be persuaded that coercion
did not mean, in some way, opposition to themselves and their past
party principles. Though patriotism was the rule with persons of
all parties North, there were yet many who professed that true
loyalty lay along lines other than the preservation of the Union
by war. These even, after Sumter fell, pretended to, and possibly
did, believe what the South repudiated, to wit: That by the siren
song of peace it could be wooed back to loyalty under the Constitution.
There were, of course, those in the North who honestly held that
the Abolitionists by their opposition to slavery and its extension
into the Territories had brought on secession, and that such
opposition justified it. This number, however, was at first not
large, and as the war progressed it grew less and less. It should
be remembered that coercion of armed secession was not undertaken
to abolish slavery or to alter its status in the slave States.
The statement, however, that the destruction of slavery was the
purpose and end in view was persistently put forth as the justifying
cause for dissolving the Union of States. The cry that the war on
the part of the North was "an abolition war," that it was for "negro
equality," had its effect on the more ignorant class of free laborers
in both sections. There is an inherent feeling of or desire for
superiority in all races, and this weakness, if it is such, is
exceedingly sensitive to the touch of the demagogue.
There were those high in authority in the Confederate councils who
were not entirely deluded by the apparent indifference and supineness
of the Northern people. When Davis and his Cabinet held a conference
(April 9th) to consider the propriety of firing on Fort Sumter,
there was not entire unanimity on the question. Robert Toombs,
Secretary of State, is reported to have said:
"The firing on that fort will inaugurate a civil war greater than
any the world has yet seen; and I do not feel competent to advise
you."(19)
And later in the conference Toombs, in opposing the attack on
Sumter, said:
"Mr. President, at this time it is suicide, murder, and will lose
us every friend at the North. You will wantonly strike a hornet's
nest which extends from mountain to ocean, and legions now quiet
will swarm out and sting us to death. It is unnecessary; it puts
us in the wrong; it is fatal."(20)
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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