The most notable event of the day was the opening fire of a score of artillery pieces in broad daylight from a quarter where no enemy was known to be. Captain Morgan (13th Pennsylvania Cavalry), who was charged with the duty of patrolling the Romney and Pughtown roads, was censured for failing to discover and report the presence of the enemy. In a large sense this censure was unjust. His report, made about 2 P.M., that no enemy was found on these roads or near them, was doubtless then true, yet an hour later Early with three of his brigades reached them about one mile in front of the earthwork occupied by me. At that time Captain Morgan had finished his reconnoissance and returned to camp. There was, however, a lack of vigilance on the part of somebody; possibly General Milroy was not altogether blameless. As has already been stated, I was not charged with the duty of ascertaining the movements of the enemy; on the contrary, I had been informed that pickets and scouts covered my front. It is the only instance, perhaps, in the war of such a surprise. The situation of Milroy's command was now critical. He had about 7000 men able for duty, more troops than could be used in the forts or protected by them. Colonel A. T. McReynolds, of the 1st New York Cavalry, who commanded Milroy's Third Brigade at Berryville, some ten miles eastward of us, was attacked on the 13th, and, pursuant to orders, retired, reaching Winchester at 9 P.M. It was certainly known on the 14th that Ewell had at least 20,000 men of all arms, and it was clear that while we might stand an assault, our artillery ammunition would soon be exhausted, and the surrender of the entire command, if it remained, become inevitable. About 11 A.M. I was present in the principal fort at what was called a council of war, but my opinion was not asked or expressed as to the propriety of undertaking to escape. I ventured, however, to suggest that if a surrender were contemplated, I could take my infantry command out that night, with perhaps others, by the Back Creek or Apple-Pie Ridge road without encountering the enemy, and could safely reach Pennsylvania by keeping well to the west of Martinsburg. It was decided about midnight, however, to spike the guns, abandon all wagons, and all sick and wounded and stores of all kinds, and evacuate Winchester. The teamsters, artillerists, and camp followers were to ride and lead the horses and mules, following closely the armed troops, who were to move at 1 A.M. on the Martinsburg road. If the enemy were encountered, we were to attack him, and, if possible, cut through. The movement did not commence until 2 A.M., and the night was dark. The great body of horses and mules, being ridden by undisciplined men and unused to riders, fell into great confusion as they crowded on the pike close on the heels of the infantry. The mules brayed a chorus seldom heard, and as if prompted by a malicious desire to notify the enemy of our departure.