Slavery and four years of war : $b a political history of slavery in the United States, together with a narrative of the campaigns and battles of the Civil War in which the author took part, 1861-1865. Vols. 1-2Keifer, Joseph Warren
History
Slavery and four years of war : $b a political history of slavery in the United States, together with a narrative of the campaigns and battles of the Civil War in which the author took part, 1861-1865. Vols. 1-2
Keifer, Joseph Warren
Slavery -- United States; United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Campaigns
Nor does the objection to the matters covered by the decision rest
alone on its extra-judicial character, but on the fact that in
settling a mere individual controversy it passed from private rights
to public rights of the people in their national character, wholly
pertaining to political questions, entirely beyond the province of
the court, legally, judicially, or potentially. It had no legal
right as a court to decide or comment upon what was not before it;
it had no judicial power to make any decree to enforce public or
political rights, nor yet to enforce, by any instrumentalities or
judicial machinery,--fines, jails, etc.,--any such decrees.
Moreover, the decision invaded the express powers of the Constitution
grated to it by the Constitution "respecting the Territory of other
property belonging to the United States." This grant is preceded
in the Constitution by the language, "The Congress shall have power
to,"(93) etc.
The court entered the political field, though clothed only with
judicial power, one of the three distinct powers of the government.
For wise purposes executive, legislative, and judicial departments
were provided by the Constitution, each to be potential within its
sphere, acting always, of course, within their respective proper,
limited, constitutionally conferred authority.
"The judicial power shall extend to all _cases_ in law and equity
arising under this Constitution."(94)
This highest judicial tribunal, it is seen, passed from a case
wherein no jurisdiction, as it held, rested in the courts to enter
any form of judgment--not even for costs, to decide matters not
pertaining in any sense to the particular case, nor even to _judicial_
public rights of the people or the government, but wholly to the
political, legislative powers of Congress, not in any degree involved
in the jurisdictional question arising and decided. If it be said
that courts of review or error sometimes decide all the questions
made on the record, though some of them may not be necessary to a
complete disposition of the case before it, it must be answered
that this is most rare, if at all, where the case is disposed of,
as was the Dred Scott case, against the trial court's jurisdiction.
But, manifestly, the many political questions discussed at great
length in the opinions and formulated as _syllabi_ (quoted above)
for the case, did not and could not arise of record, and they were
not covered by assignments of error, and hence, whether the sole
question decided or to be decided was one of jurisdiction or not,
these questions can only be regarded as discussions--personal
opinions of the justices--not rising to the dignity of mere volunteer
opinions on matters of _law_; of no binding force even as _legal
precedents_, because outside of the case and record--not even
properly _obiter dicta_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account