Slavery and the ConstitutionBowditch, William I. (William Ingersoll)
Religion
Slavery and the Constitution
Bowditch, William I. (William Ingersoll)
Enslaved persons -- United States -- Social conditions; Slavery -- United States
Art. 1, sec. 9: "The _migration or importation_ of such persons as
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall
not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand
eight hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such
_importation_, not exceeding ten dollars for each person."
It is clear that this section recognizes a difference between the
meaning of _migration_ and _importation_, since, if both words mean the
same thing, no reason whatever can be assigned why a tax is not
permitted in both cases. This difference, whatever it is, must afford a
good reason why persons imported may be taxed, and persons migrating
not. The true meaning of the section seems obvious. A person who
migrates does so of his own accord: he cannot be said to be migrated by
any other person. He is wholly a free agent. A person who is imported
does not import himself, but is imported by some other person. He is
passive. The importer is the free agent; the person imported is not a
free agent. Thus the slave-laws of Virginia of 1748[W] and 1753[X]
begin--"All _persons_ who have been or shall be _imported_," &c. &c.
"_shall be_ accounted and be _slaves_." Whenever we hear an importation
spoken of, we instantly infer an importer, an _owner_, and _property_
imported. This distinction between the meaning of the two words is,
then, real. It affords a good reason for the restriction on the right to
tax. Therefore, we say, it is the true distinction. On our construction,
Congress had power to lay a tax on persons imported as property or
slaves, but had no right to tax free persons migrating.
By this clause, therefore, Congress was prevented, during twenty years,
from prohibiting the foreign slave-trade with any State that pleased to
allow it. But, by Art. 1, sec. 8, Congress had the general power "to
regulate commerce with foreign nations." Consequently, _the slave-trade
was excepted from the operation of the general power, with a view to
place the slave-trade, during twenty years, solely under the control of
the Slave States_. It could not be wholly stopped, so long as one State
wished to continue it. It is a clear compromise in favor of slavery.
True, the compromise was a temporary one; but it will be noticed, that
Congress, even after 1808, was not obliged to prohibit the trade; and,
in point of fact, until 1819 the laws of Congress authorized the States
to sell into slavery, for their own benefit, negroes imported contrary
to the laws of the United States! (Act Congr. 1807, c. 77, § 4, 6; 1818,
c. 86, § 5 and 7; 10 Wheat. Rep. 321, 322.) So unmixed should be our
satisfaction at the oft-repeated boast, that ours was the first nation
to prohibit the African slave-trade!
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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