But “the reclaiming of a fugitive slave,” says Mr. Webster, “is not a suit at the common law.” The proceedings provided for by the statute of 1793, to which he “sees no objection,” have no analogy to the writ _de homine replegiando_. But can you destroy the right to a jury trial by changing the process? A sand-hiller from Georgia or North Carolina cannot come to Massachusetts and eject Mr. Webster from his Marshfield farm without being compelled to submit the question of title to a jury. But suppose Congress should say, in effect, that any one of the seventeen thousand postmasters in the United States might be brought into Massachusetts, (and, among so numerous a body, it is no libel to say there are some reckless men,) and that the said sand-hiller might go before the said imported postmaster, and after proof “to his satisfaction,” “either by oral testimony or by affidavit,”--an affidavit, be it remembered, taken any where in the United States,--then the claimant shall be put into immediate possession of the said farm, with a right to recover costs; and suppose Mr. Webster should spurn the authority of this illegitimate court, and demand an observance of the ancient forms of law, and a trial by jury under the seventh amendment; then the claimant has only to borrow Mr. Webster’s own words, and say, “This is not a suit at the common law:”--suppose all this, I say, and I would then ask if such a proceeding would be satisfactory to the last-named gentleman? The common sense of mankind is authority good enough to answer such a question; but we have high legal authority in addition. In _Baker_ VS. _Riddle_, Mr. Justice Baldwin, one of the judges of the supreme court of the United States, held that it was not in the power of Congress to take away the right of trial by jury, secured by the seventh amendment, either,--“1. By an organization of the courts in such a manner as not to secure it to suitors;” or,--“2. By authorizing the courts to exercise, or their assumption of, equity or admiralty jurisdiction over cases at law.” “This amendment,” says he, “preserves the right of jury trial against any infringement by any department of the government.”--_Baldwin’s Rep._ 404. Now, what was Mr. Butler’s bill but “a new organization of the courts,” or, rather, a new creation of some twenty thousand courts, “in such a manner as not to secure [the right of trial by jury] to suitors?” It was, indeed, a violation of both of the principles laid down by Judge Baldwin. It was the creation of tribunals unknown to the common law, and authorizing those tribunals to decide upon rights not belonging to either “equity or admiralty jurisdiction.” In this connection, I will refer to the case of _Lee_ VS. _Lee_, 8 _Peters’s Rep._ 44.