Slipstream: the autobiography of an air craftsmanWilson, Eugene E.
History
Slipstream: the autobiography of an air craftsman
Wilson, Eugene E.
Aircraft industry -- United States -- Biography; United States. Navy -- Aviation; Wilson, Eugene E., 1887-1974
With a view to further speeding sea rescue, we asked BUAERO to
undertake for us the development of a single-float amphibian gear,
interchangeable with the seaplane float of the Vought Corsair. To
navigate a single-seater without radio out of sight of the carrier,
to engage in combat and then return to a pin-point contact with a
roving carrier, demanded real skill. In order to provide some sort
of homing device, our radio officer, Gordon Rowe, strung a loop of
wires between the wings of a Corsair, thus utilizing the loop-antenna
feature, then common in home radio sets. Rowe’s device, antedating
radar, was intended to avoid the possible loss of precious pilots and
planes but it also made the Corsair available as a liaison plane for
fighter tactics. With a good carrier-based amphibian we could extend
our control of combat units and, at the same time, release them for
safe long-range operations.
To gain experience from the Hawaiian cruise, Admiral Reeves felt
the _Langley_ should operate at least two eighteen-plane fighter
squadrons as dive bombers together with six Vought Corsair
two-seaters for scouting, rescue, and radio liaison. While the
_Langley_, with the space available in her vast, empty coal bunkers,
could easily provide ample hangar space and crew’s quarters, the
restricted area of her flight deck and the limited capacity of her
plane elevator introduced serious limitations. How to spot forty-two
airplanes on an area believed by _Langley_ officers to be adequate
for but twelve was something of a problem.
While working on this, I proceeded on another project close to my
heart, a recommendation from FLEET AIR for a long-term development
and procurement program that would conform to the one I knew to
be under way in BUAERO. If we could eliminate some of the local
partisanship that frequently obscured the fundamentals of such
problems, we might facilitate engineering progress.
When I submitted my schedule to the admiral he approved all of it
save one critical item, the construction of an experimental two-seat
fighter. The idea had originated in World War I on the Western Front,
where the classic form of attack had been a dive out of the sun onto
the enemy’s tail, to shoot him down when he wasn’t looking. Perhaps
a tail gunner might guard a pilot from such surprise, but Admiral
Reeves would have none of the idea. He thought an alert fighter pilot
could do the job by twisting his neck. If he had to lug an extra
gun and tail gunner, he would impair the combat performance of his
airplane. Besides, during maneuvers, no rear gunner could serve a
gun. This was no snap judgment on his part; he had had Wagner try it
out during tactical exercises, using Voughts to simulate two-seat
fighters. In his judgment there could be no such thing as a two-seat
“fighter.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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