From here on the conference moved rapidly to the crystallization of an idea. Since time is of the essence in mobilization, one way to save time was to build the mobilization plan into current purchasing. When the government placed an order for a certain type of equipment, it could include in the original contract an item calling out a detailed war plan to be paid for under the contract. Such a war plan would include options for war quantities and the contractor would place stand-by orders with his own suppliers for the amounts of materials of all kinds required to fill the options. He and his suppliers would go ahead with architects’ plans, drawings, and all other paper work incident to creating the expanded facilities required by the options, the idea being to get all contract paper work done, even to the determination of critical materials and priorities. Then, upon a signal of execution designating an option, the machine could start operating, without all the preliminary delays, and still leave the procurement agency free to make its decisions at the last minute. Hap Arnold listened to the discussion. “Well,” he remarked, “I see we won’t need that second day for this conference.” With that he called in General Westover and Colonel Burns, to whom the general plan was explained. General Westover closed the conference with the statement that he intended to get some such plan in operation, if it was the last thing he did. But of course, with things as they were, neither he nor anyone else could put such an idea into operation. With the outbreak of the war, responsibility for mobilization was shifted out of the Assistant Secretary’s office and into a new and independent agency, which started as the National Defense Advisory Committee and changed its name, at intervals, to the end of the emergency. Meanwhile, when I got back to Hartford and reported the experience to Don Brown, Don sat a long while looking out the window, across acres that had once been peaceful tobacco fields. “Well, Skipper,” he said finally, “it looks as though you had sold United Aircraft something, whether the Army buys it or not. We’ll start building our own war-plans organization and get it ready for trouble.” After our estimates of the cost of such a program had come in, we discovered that they totaled just $10,000 per year, the figure Glenn Martin had mentioned down in Washington, but, like Glenn, we had no idea where the money was to come from.