If only my conception of social value is granted, I may safely enough concede Professor Davenport all the depravity he can find in society, and recognize that that depravity has its part in the determination of the concrete values. Only, I would insist, virtue as well as depravity is a factor in the social will, and plays its role in determining economic values, and motivating economic activities. Legal values are not "absolute" values, in the sense that everybody obeys the law, but laws as well as lawlessness affect economic values. It may be well at this point for me to make clear my relation to Professor Davenport. Throughout this book, his theories have been subject to frequent criticism. The obvious reason is, of course, that he has made himself the leading critic of the social value concept, and hence, if that concept is to be defended, his point of view must be met. But, if that were all, he would have occupied far less of our space than has been the case. The fact is, in my judgment, that Professor Davenport is one of the commanding figures in economic theory. I think no economist has even approximated the clearness and explicitness with which he has set forth the presuppositions of the view which this book opposes, and that no economist has ever reasoned more clearly upon the basis of these presuppositions. Professor Davenport thus presents the very best object of attack, if one is to justify the social viewpoint in economic theory. My indebtedness to him is marked, and I have tried to indicate the fact from time to time in notes. His book has aided me greatly in clarifying my own ideas, and has also substantially abridged my bibliographical labors. With many of his criticisms of existing value theory, those criticisms, especially, which are concerned with the internal logical contradictions of existing value theory, I am in hearty accord. The chief difference between us at this point will be, I think, that I try to go further than he has gone. And the fundamental differences between his view and mine grow out of the different psychological, philosophical, and sociological presuppositions with which we start. I feel that the individualistic method of approaching the value problem is foredoomed, provided it be logically carried out, and I think Professor Davenport has logically carried it out! [219] I regret exceedingly that Professor Clark's absence from Columbia University during the academic year, 1910-11, has prevented my discussing this, and a host of other questions raised in this book, with him. INDEX OF NAMES Adams, T. S., 120, n. Anaximander, 60. Anaximenes, 60. Aristotle, 61, 101. Austrian School, 7, 8, 16, n., 17, 28, 29, 30, 31, 38, n., 39, 40, 41, chap. VI, 49, 108, 113, 119, 121, 125, 126, 152, n., 188-89, 192, 197, 198. Baldwin, M., 15, n., 56, 69, n., 73, 74, n., 75, 80, 84, 95, n., 167. Berkeley, G., 62. Boehm-Bawerk, E. von, 7, 29, 31, n., 37-39, 40, 44, n., 49, n., 121, 152, n., 192.