(2) There is a mind of society, a psychical organism. The minds of different individuals--themselves differentiated into systems of thoughts and feelings that are often lacking in harmonious adjustment to each other--are in such intimate interrelation that they may be said to constitute one greater mind. The physiological basis of this greater mind--if it be thought necessary to locate it--is the brains and nervous systems of individual men, _plus_ that set of physical symbols (e.g., language, literature, gestures, art, music, etc.) which are set in motion by the nerve activity of one man, and then stimulate nerve activity on the part of another. This unity is primarily a unity of _function_, however.[116] (3) The fact of individual differences among the minds of men, does not vitiate the conception of a mind of society. It rather proves the _organic_ character of the social mind, by introducing the fact of _differentiation_. The integrating element is found in the points which individual minds have in common. (4) The mind of society, like the mind of a man, is primarily volitional, and not intellectual. (Volition is here used in the wider sense, as including all motor and affective activities in mind.) Like the individual mind, the greater part of it is vaguely conscious or subconscious. (5) Less highly organized than the individual mind, the mind of society is less rational, and less highly conscious, than most, if not all, individual minds. "Social self-consciousness" is a rare, if not non-existent phenomenon. (6) The mind of society, in its entirety, is of necessity not a matter of perception for any individual. Each individual sees only that part which is in his own mind--not all of that!--and in the minds of other individuals with whom he is in communication. (7) But the minds of other men may be, and normally are, in part objects of perception for any social individual. There may be an "inferential" element in our perception of mental processes in the minds of other men, but it is not inference. (8) The individual monad is a myth. His machinery of thought--language and logic--is socially given him, his ideals and interests, his tastes even in matters of food and drink, are socially given,--apart from social intercourse his human-mental life would be mere potentiality. (9) The worth of this conception of social reality, like the worth of other scientific hypotheses, is to be determined by a pragmatic test: does it relate phenomena the connection between which was previously obscure, without introducing greater difficulties of its own? I believe that, for the problem of value theory at least, it will find such a pragmatic justification. * * * * *