There is another case which is so familiar to economists that it need merely be adverted to. Where objects of value are indivisible, we must take one _or_ the other, if there be a conflict. But, in the case of qualitatively compatible objects, a different situation is the rule. We may have _part_ of one, _and_ part of the other, and the question arises as to _how much_ of each. Here the Austrian analysis gives us an answer, which, when we generalize it, despite its antiquated psychology, may be accepted with little modification.[138] The law of "diminishing utility" as we increase the increments of each object, holds, and the problem is that of a marginal equilibrium. The young lady of our illustration would certainly have her chum if she have only one dinner, but if she have a number of dinners, the "marginal utility" of her chum's presence may sink so low that she may find the presence of some one hitherto excluded more valuable at the sixth or seventh dinner. And, indeed, our conception of qualitatively incompatible values must not be made too absolute. Human nature is accommodating and practical, and a little wickedness may be tolerated by a good man for the sake of a value which would not induce him to tolerate more. He may find the "final increment" of his Sabbath observance lower than the "initial increment" of his Sunday baseball. Two antagonistic values may cohere in the same object. Our _fearful_ sight may also be an _interesting_ sight. And the initial increment of the interest may outweigh the initial increment of the fear. But, as the interest is partially satisfied, the fear may grow, until it finally overcomes the interest, and we flee. Indeed, it may be laid down as the law of negative values that as the "supply" increases (_caeteris paribus_) the negative value rises--the obverse of the law of "diminishing (positive) utility"--a doctrine recognized, in one of its aspects, in the economic doctrine of "increasing (psychic) costs." A further point is to be noted in the case (especially though not exclusively) of these qualitatively incompatible values, where a quantitative compromise of the sort described is worked out between them. The personality itself may change, through a growing familiarity with the negative value. It may cease to be a negative value, and may become positive. And if, as may happen, this change takes place quickly, in the course of a moral crisis, our process would be, first, a gradually increasing negative value, as the "supply" of the objects of negative value is increased; next, a sudden shift from a high negative to a high positive value, as the personality changes, and we come to love what we have hated; then a gradual sinking of the new positive value as the supply is still further increased.[139]