It will be noted, further, that our analysis draws no hard and fast lines between the different sorts of value, ethical, economic, esthetic, religious, personal, etc., in the sphere of the individual's psychology. Such lines do not exist. There are shadings, gradations, quantitative differences which become distinct enough to justify a classification of values. But values never become, on the functional side, so fundamentally different in character that there can be no reduction of them to the "common denominator" of power in motivation. And especially is that a false abstraction which would separate the different sorts of value, ethical, economic, etc., into separate, water-tight systems, and let each system have its own equilibrium and its own interactions, uninfluenced by the other systems. The fact is, simply, that ethical and esthetic values may constantly reinforce economic values, economic values reinforce ethical values, or economic and ethical or other values may oppose each other, and marginal equilibria are constantly worked out between them. Or, better, _among_ them, for, while in the consciousness of the moment we may have only _two_ opposing values in mind, and may have our equilibrium apparently between just two, yet in fact the whole system of values is constantly tending toward equilibrium, ethical, religious, economic, esthetic, all asserting themselves, and finding their place in the scale, and getting their "margins" fixed,--extensive margins and intensive margins. But this is so obviously merely a generalization of well-known economic laws, that further detail is needless. One point may be mentioned, however. _Price_ is to be generalized in the same way as value. Since this equilibrium among values holds, then any object of value may be used to _measure_ the value of any other. If the presence of her chum at the fifth dinner is in equilibrium with the presence of some hitherto excluded friend, for our young lady, then the one is the _price_ of the other, and measures her value. A material good which one takes in return for an immoral act is the price of that act. And if, in a moment of fundamental ethical crisis, a man surrenders a cherished purpose about which his whole life has been built, to the allurement of some dazzling temptation, it is much more than a metaphor to speak of "the price of a soul."[141] The Austrian analysis was essentially faulty, then, not so much in its hedonistic psychology--for it can be freed from that[142]--as in its abstraction of the economic from other aspects of the individual's value system. Equilibria among economic values will not explain even the individual's economic behavior--do not by any means constitute a self-complete system. This abstraction has been noted before.[143] The other abstraction of the Austrians, the abstraction of the individual from his vital, organic connection with the social whole, we shall treat more fully later.