It is in the highest degree improbable, that any man in Sir George Prevost's army, or in the Provinces, possessing a knowledge of these facts, which were within the reach of all, should have thought it possible that on the arrival of the troops from Bourdeaux, Sackett's Harbour was or could be the point of attack, so long as our squadron was not able to take the Lake. It will, it is apprehended, tend very materially to elucidate the subsequent operations of the war, to state the views which probably influenced His Majesty's Government in sending so large a force from the Duke of Wellington's army to Canada, and the manner in which it was directed to be employed. The circumstances under which the war had been commenced on the part of the Americans, and the refusal of their Government to consider the revocation of the Orders in Council, the ostensible ground of war as a cause for pacification, had justly offended both the Government and people of Great Britain. The efforts, however, which they were called upon to make in Europe, had, until the termination of the contest by the abdication of Buonaparte, prevented the British Government from furnishing any other reinforcements for the army in the Canadas, than such as were barely sufficient, aided by the bravery of the troops, and the talents, zeal, and energy of their Commander, for the defence of the country from the repeated attacks of the enemy. As soon, however, as the peace with France placed a larger force at their disposal, His Majesty's Government resolved to avail themselves of a portion of it, in order to retaliate upon America her unjust aggressions, and to carry the war into such parts of her territory as might prove most assailable. In consequence of this determination, the expeditions to the Chesapeake and the Mississipi were planned; and with the same views three brigades were ordered from Bourdeaux to Canada. The objects contemplated in sending this reinforcement to Canada, will be best understood by a reference to Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir George Prevost, of the 3d June, 1814, in which it is said, "The object of your operations will be, First, To give immediate protection, secondly, to obtain, if possible, ultimate security, to His Majesty's possessions in America. The entire destruction of Sackett's Harbour, and the naval establishment on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, come under the first description."--"Should there be any advanced position on that part of our frontier which extends towards _Lake Champlain_, the occupation of which would materially tend to the security of the Province, you will, if you deem it expedient, expel the enemy from it, and occupy it by detachments of the troops under your command, _always, however, taking care not to expose his Majesty's troops to being cut off by too extended a line of advance_"--"At the same time, it is by no means the intention of His Majesty's Government to encourage such forward movements into the