interior of the American territory, _as might commit the safety of the force placed under your command_." It must be evident to every person in the least acquainted with the territories of America bordering upon the Canadas, that none of the objects of offensive warfare contemplated in the foregoing despatch could be undertaken without the aid and co-operation of a fleet able to contend with that of the enemy. That His Majesty's Government might be aware of the impossibility of complying with the views and wishes above described, until the naval ascendancy should be secured on Lakes Ontario and Champlain, Sir George Prevost, in his despatch to Lord Bathurst, of the 12th July, before referred to, expresses his opinion on this head, stating that he did not expect from the reports he had received from Sir James Yeo, and the officer commanding our naval forces on the Richelieu, that their fleets would be in readiness before the middle of September. Upon the arrival of the troops from France, and upon their being assembled as before stated in the neighbourhood of Montreal towards the end of August, it was ascertained that the new ship at Kingston would not be launched until towards the middle of September, and consequently, that Sir James Yeo would not be ready to take the Lake, at the earliest, until the beginning of October. All, therefore, that could be done with regard to the projected expedition against Sackett's Harbour, was to make such a disposition of the troops designed for the service, that they might be in readiness for it, whenever it might be deemed advisable to make the attempt. Major-General Sir James Kempt, who was to have the command, was accordingly dispatched to Kingston, and two brigades were quartered partly at Montreal and partly in advance, wherever he judged they might be best placed, with a view to the ultimate service for which they were designed. The employment of the remainder of the force from France next became the subject of Sir George Prevost's consideration. The enemy had at that time a strong squadron on Lake Champlain, and their naval depôt at Vergennes furnished them with the means of continually adding to it. They had also since the first attack fortified Plattsburg, a position which, provided we had the ascendancy on the Lake, it might be expedient for us to occupy for the security of the Lower Province. Should, therefore, our squadron, equipping in the Richelieu, be ready to co-operate with the army before the season was too far advanced for offensive operations, it was clear that one of the objects contemplated by Government might be undertaken with every prospect of success. The enemy's fleet, if they waited the attack upon them in Plattsburg bay, or elsewhere, might be destroyed, or the depôt at Vergennes might fall into our hands by the occupation of Plattsburg, and the further advance of the army aided by the fleet. That the enemy were not