No sooner had this position been taken, than Sir George Prevost, conceiving that the enemy, on the first approach of our troops, might not be fully prepared to receive them, proposed that the works should be immediately attacked;[83] but it being represented to him that one of the brigades was extremely harassed, having been brought forward from Chazy with great celerity, and that after allowing the men a reasonable time to rest, the afternoon would be too far advanced to attempt an operation for which it was desirable to have day-light, as the movement was to be made through so thick and intricate a country, Sir George was induced to acquiesce in this reasoning; and being likewise satisfied, from the assurance given him, by Captain Downie, that the fleet would be ready to co-operate in a day or two at farthest, he finally resolved to defer the attack until the junction of the squadron. The enemy's fleet had retired from the mouth of the Chazy (where it was placed, when our troops entered the American territory), to Plattsburg Bay, and there, on the arrival of our army, it was found anchored; their gun-boats, which had been employed to interrupt the march of our army on the Lake road, being placed so as to manifest a determination to support their troops and position on the south side of the Saranac. On the morning of the 7th, it was discovered that the enemy's flotilla had changed their position since the preceding evening, and had moved further into the bay, out of the range of cannon from the shore, evidently with the object of avoiding the fire from the works, in case they should be attacked and carried.