As soon as Sir George Prevost had, by a thorough reconnoitring of the enemy's position, on shore and in the bay, satisfied his own mind that their fleet was moored too far from the shore to receive any support from their own batteries, or any injury from ours, he communicated the enemy's force and situation to Captain Downie, by a letter[84] dated the 7th September, seven o'clock a. m., and stated, that if Captain Downie felt the vessels under his command equal to the contest, the present moment afforded advantages that might not again occur, requesting, at the same time, his decision on the subject. This letter was delivered by Major Fulton, Aid-de-Camp to Sir George Prevost, who was ordered particularly to explain to Captain Downie the position of the enemy's squadron, and that they were, in his opinion, anchored out of range of shot from the shore. Major Fulton's statement[85] on this subject, shews most clearly the views which Captain Downie then entertained, and the confidence which he felt in the result of the contest, for which he declared he would be ready in 24 hours. Captain Downie's letter, in reply to Sir George Prevost's communication, although more guarded in expression, contained in substance what he had said to Major Fulton, and confirmed the expectation of his being able to meet the enemy in a day or two. On the 8th of September Sir George Prevost again despatched a letter to Captain Downie, stating that he had sent his Aid-de-Camp, Major Coore, to give him correct information with regard to the enemy's naval force in the bay, and that he, Sir George Prevost, only waited the arrival of Captain Downie to proceed against General Macomb's position. In this letter he particularly points out the co-operation which he expected from Captain Downie. That officer's answer, dated on the same day, states, "that his ship was _not ready, and that until she should be, it was his duty not to hazard her before the enemy_;" and this determination of Captain Downie's appears to have been still more strongly expressed by him in his conversation with Major Coore. Hitherto, therefore it may be assumed as an incontrovertible fact, that nothing had been either said or written by Sir George Prevost to Captain Downie which might lead the latter to expect any assistance in his approaching contest with the American fleet, from the forces on shore, or that any simultaneous attack was to be made upon the enemy's works, with a view to afford such aid or support. Being thus perfectly aware of the number, force, and position of the enemy's fleet, and finding himself ready for a conflict, of the successful issue of which we may be assured that he had not a doubt, Captain Downie, on the 9th of September, wrote to Sir George Prevost, informing him that it was his intention to weigh and proceed with his squadron, so as to approach Plattsburg Bay at day-break on the 10th, and to commence an immediate attack on the enemy's squadron, if it should be found