Nor will the assertion, that Sir George Prevost disregarded the supposed signal of co-operation, and neglected to attack the fort according to his promise, be more difficult to disprove. No such signal was in fact ever arranged, nor was any such promise ever given. The destruction of the enemy's fleet being the primary object of the expedition, and until that was effected, the ulterior operations not being practicable, Sir George Prevost resolved not to assault the fort until he was satisfied that our squadron was actually proceeding to attack the enemy. Of the result of the action when the fleets were once engaged, neither the Commander of the forces, nor any one in our army allowed themselves to entertain a single doubt. That Sir George Prevost intended to assault the enemy's works simultaneously, or nearly so, with the commencement of the naval action, and that Captain Downie was aware of that determination, appears from the correspondence between those officers. But that Captain Downie should have gathered from these communications any thing like a promise or agreement on the part of the Commander of the forces to support, assist, or co-operate with him during the naval engagement, is quite impossible. Sir George Prevost had satisfied himself by personal observation, and by the most accurate intelligence, that the American fleet was anchored out of range of the batteries, and he must therefore have known that it was out of his power to offer any support to Captain Downie. To have held forth to that officer any hope or promise of assistance was consequently out of the question. It was of the first importance, with a view to the success of Sir George Prevost's operations, that the fleet should be engaged at the same time, or before the fort was assaulted, but of no consequence whatever to Captain Downie, that the fort should be attacked simultaneously with the naval force. Sir George Prevost, therefore, in his communications with the naval Commander, and particularly in his letter of the 10th, mentioned his intention of making nearly a simultaneous attack, _as part of his own plan of operations_, with which it was necessary that Captain Downie should be acquainted. It is highly probable, that Captain Downie inferred from this communication, that the attack on the fort which Sir George Prevost had been in readiness to make on the morning of the 10th, would be made at the time when the fleets should engage, but there is not the _slightest_ ground for believing that this expectation led him to place any reliance upon the land attack, as a co-operation in support of the naval force, or that it induced him to hasten into action, at a time when he felt unequal to it, or unprepared for the contest. Had he considered the expressions used by Sir George Prevost, in his letter of the 10th, as importing an agreement to assist him by a simultaneous attack on shore, he would certainly have