It has thus been shewn, that there was not even an understanding between Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, that the attack by land and sea should take place simultaneously, for the purpose of affording protection or support to our squadron, much less that there existed any "solemn agreement" to that effect. It must also be evident, from the previous statement, that the attack on shore did actually take place at the commencement of the naval action, and that the sudden and unexpected termination of the latter engagement alone prevented the prosecution of the military operations. Orders, as we have already shewn, had been given by Sir George Prevost, on the 9th, for the troops to hold themselves in readiness for the attack of the enemy's works on the morning of the 10th, and those orders were accompanied, as every military man knows, and as the Reviewer[87] himself must have known, is usual, by an order _to cook_, when the time will admit.[88] It has also been shewn, that early on the morning of the 11th, and before the fleet was in sight, or the scaling of their guns was heard, similar orders were circulated for the troops to hold themselves in readiness for the attack, and so well prepared were the forces on shore to make the attack, that almost at the same moment when the Confiance began to engage the enemy, the troops were in motion for the assault. Our batteries, as mentioned above, opened on the enemy's works some time before the commencement of the naval action on the part of the Confiance. Until confidently assured that the fleets would engage (and many circumstances might have intervened to prevent it even after the appearance of our squadron) Sir George Prevost felt that it would be highly imprudent in him to commence the attack; but the moment he learned that Captain Downie was actually in contact with the enemy, the troops were immediately ordered to take their position for the assault.