[47] Review, p. 411. [48] Review, pp. 418, 419, 420. [49] Vide the Report in the Appendix, No. XXII. [50] Review, p. 419. [51] Review, p. 418. [52] Review, p. 420. [53] There cannot be a stronger contradiction to the Reviewer's assertion, that the order to retreat was precipitate, than the fact which was known to every officer engaged in the expedition, that after the last assault, and before any order was given for the retreat or re-embarkation of the troops, a flag of truce was sent into the town, with a summons for the surrender of the place, and that some time necessarily elapsed before a refusal was received to that demand. It was not until after the return of the officer with that refusal, and when all hope of the co-operation of the fleet had been relinquished, the artillery still not having been landed, that the order was given for the re-embarkation of the troops. [54] Review, p. 419. [55] Vide Appendix, No. XXIII. [56] Review, p. 425. [57] Vide Review, p. 426. [58] Review, p. 427. [59] Review, p. 425. [60] Review, p. 427. [61] Review, p. 427. [62] Review, p. 427. [63] "I have had the honor to receive your letters of the 9th and 18th inst. The first I received at York on my way to the centre division, and I cannot refrain from expressing my regret at your having allowed the clamour of the Indian warriors to induce you to commit a part of your force in an unequal and hopeless combat. "You cannot be ignorant of the limited nature of the force at my disposal for the defence of our extensive frontier, and ought, therefore, not to count too largely upon my disposition to strengthen the right division." [64] Review, p. 428. [65] The order here alluded to by Capt. Barclay, is contained in a letter from the Adjutant-General, Col. Baynes, to General Procter, dated the 18th Sept. 1813, nine days after the naval action had taken place, and before the account of it had reached Sir George Prevost. This letter was written in contemplation of the necessity of General Procter retiring from Amherstburgh, in consequence of the difficulties of his situation, in which case it was thought advisable that an action should be risked. [66] Vide Appendix, No. XXIV. [67] Vide the Proceedings of the Court-martial, Appendix, No. XXV. [68] Review, p. 432. [69] Review, pp. 433, 434. [70] Ibid, pp. 438, 439. [71] Vide General Orders, Appendix, No. XXVI. [72] Review, p. 440. [73] Vide Extracts in the Appendix, No. XXVII. [74] Review, p. 441. [75] Review, pp. 440, 441. [76] Review, p. 441. [77] Review, p. 442. [78] Ibid. p. 443. [79] Review, p. 443. [80] Ibid. [81] As a confirmation of this statement, the reader is referred to an extract from a Letter addressed by Major-General Kempt to Sir George Prevost upon the subject of the intended attack on Sackett's Harbour, of which General Kempt was to have taken the personal command. Appendix, No. XXVIII.