NOTE.--Major Strategy in its broadest sense has also to deal with the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship. It regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together; they are instruments of war. But it also has to keep in view constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and its commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). The friction of these two considerations is inherent in war, and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question of grand strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa. For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versa. To decide a question of grand strategy without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This interaction has to be accepted by commanding officers as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers. Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with-- (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation. (2) The directing of the force assigned for the operation. Minor Strategy may be of three kinds:-- (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only. (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only. (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together. NOTE.--It will be seen that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy, is only a sub-division of a division of strategy, and that, therefore, strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. NOTE.--Naval Strategy, being only a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government, or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.