The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it. The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._, till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea. It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with England. The truth of this appears from the fact that _general command of the sea is not essential to all oversea operations_. In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. The weaker Power may take advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere. _Rule 1._ So long as a state of dispute can force the preponderating Power to concentrate, operating by evasion is possibly open to the weaker. _Rule 2._ In a state of dispute although the weaker Power may not be able to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own. EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a decision by defeating Conflans and De la Cloue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar. SHOULD COMMAND OF THE SEA ALWAYS BE THE PRIMARY OBJECT? When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._, leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out counter operations elsewhere. Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it, because general command may be in dispute while local command may be with us, and political or military considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have obtained a complete decision. From the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too loose an expression for strategical discussion. For practical purposes should be substituted "_control of passage and communication_." The question then in the consideration of any proposed operation or line of operations will be, not "Have we the command of the sea?" but "Can we secure the necessary lines of communication from obstruction by the enemy?" METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL 1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions. 2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by:-- (a) A defensive action not necessarily entirely successful (containing). (b) Forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).