At sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's. Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. EXAMPLE.--This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our getting a fleet off Brest before the French could sail. Hence the maxim "that the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like. But these maxims are not universally true, witness Togo's strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast. Take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. Here again Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim. The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them unsafe it must be put out of action." The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always. EXAMPLE.--Opening of War of Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. 1703.--Chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and particularly of Portugal, and with same object in view, Rooke's official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened our communications. RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from which France could not eject us, and she abandoned struggle for sea communications. But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable:-- (a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the enemy's fleet. (b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt _to control the common communications_. (c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex (_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a blow which solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir Palmes Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703 (_England in the Mediterranean_, Vol. II., p. 234). Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign. This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, but by the operation of inevitable strategical law).