It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient. Example.--For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders were to prevent the troops and warlike stores which De la Motte was taking out from reaching Canada. It was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels; thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount of harm with the least possible good. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE _Nature of Object_ Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between _offensive_ and _defensive_, upon which all strategical calculation must be based. Consequently, the solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view. All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative. A _positive_ object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for ourselves. A _negative_ object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent his gaining something. Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive. Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive. This is the only certain test by which we can decide whether any particular operation is offensive or defensive. Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the primary or secondary objects which lead up to them; _e.g._, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the primary objects may be defensive, and _vice versa_. For example, in the Russo-Japanese War the ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive). The ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive). _Relation of Offensive to Defensive_