Some Principles of Maritime StrategyCorbett, Julian Stafford
History
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
Corbett, Julian Stafford
Naval strategy
Examples.--Diversion.--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force,
about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instruction, "a diversion
on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the army
employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was
negative--preventive--defensive. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against
New Orleans in 1815. Intended force, 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to
obtain command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to
occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which
the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was
positive--to acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) with those
against Martinique and Belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the Seven Years'
War.
This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined expeditions,
as used by Elizabethan strategists, viz., raids, incursions, and invasions.
These correspond respectively with our modern diversions, eccentric
attacks, and true direct offensive.
LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WARS
From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification
of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_.
(1) _War with limited object_ ("limited war") is where the object is
merely to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions
or interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the
liberation of Cuba.
(2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where the object is to overthrow
the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must
agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War.
PLANS OF WAR
_System of Operations_
Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object
(_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or
unlimited), Strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of
the war."
Apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends mainly upon--
(1) The theatre of the war.
(2) The various theatres of operation available within it.
1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "All the territory upon which
the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an
Island Power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer
definition: "Geographical areas within which must lie the operations
necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war and of the
subordinate objects that lead up to them."
A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."
2. _Theatre of Operations._--Is generally used of the operations of one
belligerent only.
An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.
A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory
we seek to take possession of or to defend.
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