STRANGER: In all and every art, what the craftsman ought to say in answer to any question is written down in a popular form, and he who likes may learn. THEAETETUS: I suppose that you are referring to the precepts of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts? STRANGER: Yes, my friend, and about a good many other things. In a word, is not the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things? THEAETETUS: Certainly; there does not seem to be much which is left out. STRANGER: But oh! my dear youth, do you suppose this possible? for perhaps your young eyes may see things which to our duller sight do not appear. THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding? I do not think that I understand your present question. STRANGER: I ask whether anybody can understand all things. THEAETETUS: Happy would mankind be if such a thing were possible! SOCRATES: But how can any one who is ignorant dispute in a rational manner against him who knows? THEAETETUS: He cannot. STRANGER: Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power? THEAETETUS: To what do you refer? STRANGER: How do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme and universal wisdom? For if they neither disputed nor were thought to dispute rightly, or being thought to do so were deemed no wiser for their controversial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one would give them money or be willing to learn their art. THEAETETUS: They certainly would not. STRANGER: But they are willing. THEAETETUS: Yes, they are. STRANGER: Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute? THEAETETUS: Certainly. STRANGER: And they dispute about all things? THEAETETUS: True. STRANGER: And therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all-wise? THEAETETUS: Certainly. STRANGER: But they are not; for that was shown to be impossible. THEAETETUS: Impossible, of course. STRANGER: Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth? THEAETETUS: Exactly; no better description of him could be given. STRANGER: Let us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly explain his nature. THEAETETUS: What is it? STRANGER: I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things, by a single art. THEAETETUS: All things? STRANGER: I see that you do not understand the first word that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning of 'all.' THEAETETUS: No, I do not. STRANGER: Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and trees. THEAETETUS: What do you mean? STRANGER: Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all creatures. THEAETETUS: What would he mean by 'making'? He cannot be a husbandman;--for you said that he is a maker of animals.