For the same reason, consideration of interference with enemy communications is included, so far as significance attaches to them with respect to the theater of operations. This portion of the Estimate Form varies greatly with the type of problem under consideration. However, in all estimates, this is the place where the commander searches the theater for factors affecting communications for the particular problem. * * * * * With the completion of this subsection of the estimate, the commander has assembled and placed in workable form the information to which he expects to refer in the succeeding parts of the estimate. (3) Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength. Having surveyed the means available and opposed, as well as the characteristics of the theater of operations, the commander will find it useful to summarize the pertinent information available, in order that the strength and weakness of own and enemy forces can be readily visualized and compared. Thus the existing advantages and disadvantages are made apparent, and conclusions are drawn as to relative fighting strength. A satisfactory procedure is to place strength and weakness factors in parallel columns for own and enemy forces. From careful consideration of the facts so far determined in Section I-B, there are extracted and expressed briefly the pertinent strength and weakness factors. It is usually easier to determine all the strength and weakness factors in detailed tactical estimates than in broad strategical estimates. The former deal in relatively more factual terms, with definite comparisons such as with respect to maximum speeds, numbers and caliber of guns, numbers and types of aircraft, numbers and types of torpedoes, and other such items which give the factual basis for comparison. In broad strategical estimates, this factual basis is present, e.g., as to distances, radii of ships, geographical locations of forces, and the like. But other factors may not be so definite, especially as regards enemy forces. For example, it will often be difficult for the commander to say that the enemy's logistics problem is easier or more difficult than his own, unless he has a good idea of the amount of fuel, ammunition, and stores available to the enemy within the time limits involved. The evaluation of training, spirit, health, and courage of personnel is, as previously noted, relatively easy to determine for own forces, but more or less of a conjecture in regard to the enemy.