The enemy had now placed a 1-pound Maxim and a 12½-pounder on the east side of the line 4000 yards to the south of the main camp, but fortunately the right flank was protected by the Chief Bathoen, who defied the Boers to enter his territory. The left flank, however, engaged Colonel Plumer's attention, and there was every fear that the enemy, repulsed on the western border, might fall in force upon the Rhodesians. The Dutchmen were now busy in wrecking the rail south of Lobatsi, and preparing to meet any further advance made by Colonel Plumer with stout resistance. On the 18th, somewhat exhausted with fruitless toil and endless marching and fighting, the troops were once more at their starting-point on the ridges overlooking the Metsima Suma and Notwani Rivers, Colonel Plumer's force now occupying the position there formerly held by the Boers. On the 21st Commandant Snyman entertained himself with a little journey to Lobatsi and gaily bombarded it, in ignorance that it had been evacuated by Colonel Plumer's force, and explosions on all sides announced that he also was engaged in the destruction of the railway. While the Boers were away, the Baralongs made hay--they utilised the shining hour by looting some of the Boer cattle and driving them in triumph into Mafeking. There, the result of Snyman's attack on Plumer was in its way approved; the town enjoyed temporary repose. The bombardment lessened for a day or two, and the besieged were buoyed up by the hope that Colonel Plumer was pursuing his advance. To intercept the same the enemy had taken up positions at Maritzuni and Ramathlabama, but they at the same time had to engage themselves with a native chief in the south. This personage, who had hitherto been friendly to them, working on the good old principle of "kick a man when he's down," had heard of the Boer reverses in the Free State, and promptly seized his opportunity. On the 25th Colonel Plumer left his base camp with a force of infantry and as little impedimenta as possible, and invaded the Transvaal, making two rapid night marches for the purpose of threatening the Boer lines of communication. In this way, though he found himself too weak in men and guns for really aggressive operations, he determined to make himself a thorn in the side of the persecutors of Mafeking, and keep the Boer hordes too busily engaged to allow of their attempting serious operations on their own part.