South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 5 (of 8): From the Disaster at Koorn Spruit to Lord Roberts's Entry into PretoriaCreswicke, Louis
History
South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 5 (of 8): From the Disaster at Koorn Spruit to Lord Roberts's Entry into Pretoria
Creswicke, Louis
South African War, 1899-1902; Transvaal (South Africa) -- History
[8] While dealing with the matter it is due to General Colvile to repeat
the statement made by himself at the end of the year to a representative
of Reuter's Agency:--
"I am accused of being chiefly responsible for the surrender of the
Yeomanry at Lindley. In my opinion the primary cause of this surrender
was the insufficient information given by the headquarters staff to
Colonel Spragge and myself. Had I been informed of Lord Roberts's
intentions and of the intended movements of Colonel Spragge, who was in
command of the Yeomanry, and had Colonel Spragge been made acquainted
with the orders I received from Lord Roberts, this disaster would never
have happened. The following details will make it clear that the loss of
the Yeomanry was primarily due to bad staff work. On May 20 I received a
telegram from the chief of the staff ordering me to concentrate my
troops, consisting of the Highland Brigade, the Eastern Province Horse,
a field battery, and two naval guns, at Ventersburg on May 23, to leave
that town on the 24th and to march to Heilbron, _via_ Lindley, arriving
at Lindley on May 26, and at Heilbron on the 29th. I was informed that I
should be joined at Ventersburg by the 13th Imperial Yeomanry and
Lovat's Scouts.
"On arrival at Ventersburg, finding that neither the Yeomanry nor the
Scouts were there, I informed the chief of the staff by telegraph, but
received no answer from him at the time, though his reply was handed to
me more than a month later, among a bundle of undelivered telegrams.
This telegram was worded as follows: 'May 24. Yeomanry are so late they
cannot catch you at Ventersburg. You must march without them. They will
join you later _via_ Kroonstad.' As I did not receive the telegram till
the march was over it did not affect my action, but had I received it at
the time its wording would have led me to suppose that the Yeomanry
would join me at Heilbron, as was actually the case with Lovat's Scouts.
At this time Lord Roberts's army was disposed roughly as follows:
General Hunter's Division on the Kimberley-Mafeking Railway, Lord
Methuen on the Vaal River, headquarters and General Pole-Carew's
Division on the Bloemfontein-Johannesburg Railway, General Ian
Hamilton's column at Heilbron, and General Rundle and Brabant to the
south-east of me. It was, therefore, extended across the Free State, and
I assumed that Lord Roberts intended to advance in this formation,
sweeping all before him till he got within striking distance of the
Vaal, thus forcing the enemy to extend, and that he would then select
one point for forcing the passage of the river. I also supposed that
Heilbron, which is the head of a short line of railway, would be the
supply depot for the columns to the east, as Winburg had been.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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