South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 7 (of 8): The Guerilla War, from February 1901 to the Conclusion of HostilitiesCreswicke, Louis
History
South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 7 (of 8): The Guerilla War, from February 1901 to the Conclusion of Hostilities
Creswicke, Louis
South African War, 1899-1902; Transvaal (South Africa) -- History
In addition to the accusations regarding the concentration camps,
invented by traitors to the country that housed and sheltered them,
there were other arguments to be met. "How is it, if you send this
vast number of horses--if you have your columns--if you have good
leaders who are well equipped--that our men cannot catch the enemy? Is
your intelligence defective; is your system at fault?" The explanation
given by Mr. Brodrick, one which showed a serious development of the
war, was this: "The system of our country and people with regard to
the Kaffir is different from the Boer system. The Boer columns have
only too frequently in the last few months eluded our columns by
hiding their tracks, by murdering the Kaffirs behind them. It is a
serious charge, and I make it only for this reason, that I had
occasion to notice that in the secret intelligence reports so many
cases were mentioned of the murder of Kaffirs that I telegraphed to
Lord Kitchener to ask whether this was a general practice, or whether
it was the occasion of isolated persons. His reply was: 'Cold-blooded
murders by the Boers have been frequent of late. It was only on the
10th inst. two dead infants were found with their hands tied behind
them down a main shaft at Freylingstadt.' The leader of a column,
whose letter I saw not long ago, mentioned that he was within two or
three hours of a column of the enemy whom he had been pursuing for a
considerable number of hours--that was at a Kaffir kraal--and he found
the place deserted, but in one of the houses he found four little
Kaffir boys, all under twelve, all with their heads battered in two or
three hours before." Mr. Brodrick proceeded to explain that he did not
bring this forward with the intention of making an impeachment against
the whole Boer nation. Indeed, the statement was forced from him by
friends of the enemy who at one time jeered at the Government and our
Military Commanders for not beating the Boers, and at another
complained that negotiations and blandishments were not substituted
for the slow system of physical pressure that was found by the
Commander-in-Chief to be the surest means to the end--the peaceable
end.
Both Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner decided that it was of no use
either to threaten or to wheedle, the one and only thing was
imperturbably to squeeze, reserving the policy of clemency for the
proper season, when the surrendered Boers should have become our
fellow-subjects. Accordingly we still continued to pour fresh
regiments into the country. Four thousand trained mounted troops were
now on their way out to replace those that needed rest, and India was
providing four battalions and two more cavalry regiments in return for
other troops which would take their place there. Some militia
regiments were also being sent to the front, and further Colonial
contingents, so that thus reinforced the tired veterans would receive
a fillip for future operations.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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