South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 7 (of 8): The Guerilla War, from February 1901 to the Conclusion of HostilitiesCreswicke, Louis
History
South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 7 (of 8): The Guerilla War, from February 1901 to the Conclusion of Hostilities
Creswicke, Louis
South African War, 1899-1902; Transvaal (South Africa) -- History
A co-operative movement was now organised for the purpose of making a
descent on Langkloof (near the junction of the Olifant and Wilge
Rivers), where the Boer Government was shortly expected to arrive, but
owing to the nature of the rocky and intersected country, the
arrangements were impeded. The said Government, by the time the troops
surrounded the place, had got some hours' start and were well on their
way to Pietersburg. Colonel Park, who was unavoidably prevented
from reaching his assigned position in time, proceeded to investigate
the kloofs on the western side of Rhenoster Kop, and unearthed
seventeen prisoners and many oxen, horses, and vehicles.
TRANSVAAL (WEST)
Operations continued in February as before, save that Colonel Von
Donop at Wolmaranstad had succeeded temporarily to the command of Lord
Methuen's mobile troops. On the 23rd an empty convoy of over one
hundred waggons was despatched to refill at Klerksdorp and bring back
supplies to Wolmaranstad. The escort was composed of 5th Imperial
Yeomanry, three companies 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, two guns and a
pom-pom, under Colonel W. C. Anderson (Imperial Yeomanry). Till the
25th all went well. Then, before dawn, as the convoy was moving from
its bivouac ground ten miles south-east of Klerksdorp, a furious
attack was made on the advance guard from the darkness of dense bush
on the left. Flashes and forks of flame only showed where the enemy
plied his rifles, but on this point the guns and pom-pom at once
opened fire. The waggons of the convoy, which had stampeded back to
the old camping-ground in the midst of the first shock of attack, were
again closed up as rapidly as possible from the rear. A second and a
third attack upon the rearguard were boldly and indeed brilliantly
repulsed. Then Colonel Anderson, fearing the increased pressure on his
rearguard, ordered the convoy to proceed towards Klerksdorp,
instructing his transport officer to try and trot the waggons clear of
the fire. He then made noble efforts to extricate his force,
supporting the hard pressed rearguard, as it struggled to cover the
retirement, with his guns and such troops as could be collected from
the front. But without avail. The enemy under Delarey and Kemp, old
and accomplished hands, kept the advantage. They had had the first
word in the darkness; they were superior in numbers; they pressed
triumphantly forward and caught the convoy where they had expected to
catch it--in crossing the Jagd Spruit. The difficulty of the
operation, the terror and stampede of natives and beasts in the hail
of bullets that fell on them, contributed to the disaster. The convoy
was lost. The escort, gallant and stubborn, was overpowered; 5
officers and 53 men fell, 6 officers and 123 men were wounded. The
remainder, with the exception of 3 officers and 106 men, who reached
Klerksdorp, were captured. They were subsequently released. Though the
pursuit of the Boers was at once taken up, little could be done. The
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account