"A serious question is raised by my failure to-day. I do not now consider that I am strong enough to relieve Ladysmith. Colenso is a fortress which, if not captured by a rush, could, I think, only be taken by a siege. Within the eight miles from the point of attack there is no water, and in this weather that exhausts infantry. The place is fully entrenched. I do not think we saw either a gun or a Boer all day, but the fire brought to bear on us was very heavy. The infantry were willing enough to fight, but the intense heat absolutely exhausted them. I consider I ought to let Ladysmith go and to occupy a good position for the defence of South Natal, and so let time help us. But I feel I ought to consult you on such a step. Twenty thousand men, I consider, faced us to-day; both in arms and in position they had the advantage. They admit, indeed, that they suffered severely, but my men are dispirited because they have not seen a dead Boer. My losses have not been very heavy; much heavier, indeed, I could have made them, but the moment I failed to get on the run the result would have been the same. I was beaten. I now feel I cannot say that with my available force I can relieve Ladysmith, and I suggest that for me to occupy a defensive position and fight it out in a country better suited to our tactics is the best thing that I can do." FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR TO GENERAL SIR R. BULLER. "WAR OFFICE, _December 16, 1899_. "The abandonment of White's force and its consequent surrender is regarded by the Government as a national disaster of the greatest magnitude. We would urge you to devise another attempt to carry out its relief, not necessarily viâ Colenso, making use of the additional men now arriving if you think fit." FROM SIR R. BULLER TO SIR G. WHITE. "_December 16, 1899_. "I tried Colenso yesterday but failed; the enemy is too strong for my force, except with siege operations, and these will take one full month to prepare. Can you last so long? If not, how many days can you give me in which to take up defensive position? After which I suggest you firing away as much ammunition as you can and making best terms you can. I can remain here if you have alternative suggestion, but unaided I cannot break in. I find my Infantry cannot fight more than ten miles from camp, and then only if water can be got, and it is scarce here." NOTE.--In his subsequent message of 17th December Sir R. Buller said the above message had been signalled correctly, but asked to make the following corrections:--