It was not until June 22, or thirteen days after his departure from Tampa, that General Shafter landed his troops at Baiquiri, a point on the coast some miles southwest of Santiago. There was furious fighting during the three following days, and there was a grievous loss of life on the American side, infantry and dismounted cavalry having been ordered or allowed to attack intrenchments without artillery support. The necessity of heavy siege guns was at once clear to professional soldiers, but these could not be moved from the transports to the shore, because only one lighter had been brought from Tampa, and even that one had been lost. This loss could have been quickly repaired, had not General Shafter refused to take with him from Tampa the signal train that had been made ready for him, on the ground that he “only wanted men who could carry muskets.” The result of this indifference to a branch of the service which constitutes the eyes, ears and voice of a modern army, was that it required two days to transmit a request from Shafter’s headquarters to the point where the cable could be used. On June 29, not having, as yet, any heavy siege guns in position, and not having so surrounded the city as to prevent the re-enforcement or escape of its garrison, General Shafter telegraphed to Washington: “I can take Santiago in forty-eight hours.” On July 1 and 2, General Shafter made resolute assaults upon the Spanish intrenchments and carried many of them, advancing his own lines very much nearer the city. The advantage thus gained, however, had cost him a considerable fraction of his force. The whole number of Americans killed, wounded and missing during the land operations reached ten per cent of the number with which General Shafter landed on June 22. Of these land engagements the most notable were those of Aguadores, El Caney and San Juan. The battle of San Juan is described as follows: