We pass to the memorable naval combat of July 3, which annihilated Cervera’s squadron, and dealt the deathblow to Spain’s hope of making head against America on the sea. There is, of course, no foundation for the report that Admiral Cervera resolved to fly because he knew that Santiago would be immediately taken. The truth is that, on July 2, he received peremptory orders from Madrid to leave Santiago at once, no matter what might be the consequences; to engage the American fleet, and to make his way, if possible, to Havana, where he would raise the blockade. These orders he did his best to execute on the morning of July 3, having been informed by signal that Admiral Sampson’s flagship, the “New York,” and a large part of the American fleet, were lying at some distance toward the east, and that only the “Brooklyn,” “Texas” and “Iowa” would have to be encountered if the escaping ships moved westward. There was a mistake in this computation, for the “Oregon” also took an important part in the action, and so did the little “Gloucester,” a converted yacht, which did not hesitate, single-handed, to engage both of the torpedo-boat destroyers. With such information as he could procure, however, Admiral Cervera believed that his ships could outsail all of those blockading the mouth of the harbor, except the “Brooklyn,” and that, if the “Brooklyn” could be disabled, some, at least, of his vessels could escape. Accordingly, orders were issued by the Spanish admiral to proceed at full speed to the westward after clearing the entrance, and to concentrate fire upon the “Brooklyn.” In the attempt to carry out this programme, the four warships, “Maria Teresa,” “Almirante Oquendo,” “Vizcaya” and “Cristobal Colon,” followed by the torpedo-boat destroyers “Pluton” and “Furor,” in the order named and in single file, pushed with all steam up through the narrow passage which had been left by the sunken “Merrimac.” The concerted endeavor to disable the “Brooklyn” failed, and it turned out that both the “Oregon” and “Texas” were faster than the “Cristobal Colon,” which was much the swiftest of the Spanish squadron. The “Maria Teresa,” the “Almirante Oquendo” and the “Vizcaya” were successively riddled and put _hors de combat_ by the rapid and accurate firing of the American ships, and were beached by their officers to avoid, not so much surrender, as the danger of explosion. The “Cristobal Colon” succeeded in reaching a point about fifty miles from Santiago, when it was headed off not only by the protected cruiser “Brooklyn,” but also by the ironclads “Oregon” and “Texas.” From that moment, escape was seen to be impossible, so the commander beached his ship and hauled down his flag. This closing incident of the battle took place at 1.20 P.M., almost exactly four hours after the leading vessel of the escaping column, the “Maria Teresa,” had passed the Morro. Meanwhile, the little “Gloucester,” under Commander Richard Wainwright, had stopped both of the torpedo-boat